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This paper generalizes the standard methods of solving rational expectations models to the case
of time-varying nonstochastic parameters, recurring in a ￿nite cycle. Such a speci￿cation occurs
in a simple stylized New Keynesian model of the euro area when we combine the rotation in the
ECB Governing Council (as constituted by the Treaty of Nice) and home bias in the interest
rate decisions taken by its members. In small and mid-size economies, this combination slightly
increases output and in￿ation volatility, as compared to a monetary policy setup without rotation.
The method of Christiano (2002) has also been applied to solve the model when we assume a
lagged perception of foreign macroeconomic shocks by domestic agents. When the cross-country
synchronization of shocks is low or moderate and when these shocks are relatively persistent, the
exclusion of contemporaneous foreign shocks from domestic agents’ information sets may raise the
volatility of output. There is also some tentative evidence that this e￿ect could particularly a￿ect
mid-size economies.
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31 Introduction
The launch of the euro area project has opened space for empirical research and policy discussions
on asymmetric shocks and adjustment mechanisms in their aftermath. Achieving a high capacity to
absorb such shocks in the absence of autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy has become one
of key economic policy targets, both for member and candidate countries. Market-based adjustment
rests mainly upon the competitiveness channel (see European Commission, 2006, 2008; Narodowy Bank
Polski, 2009). The adjustment process, however, may be hampered by the procyclical real interest rate
mechanism (￿Walters critique￿; see Walters, 1994).
The functioning of both mechanisms is highly dependent on the way in which economic agents in
individual countries form their expectations. When a high in￿ation rate in an overheated economy
translates into higher in￿ation expectations, then an asymmetric cyclical position ￿ given weak (or no)
reaction from the common central bank ￿ results in a low real interest rate. This should additionally fuel
economic activity, boost the cyclical amplitude and prolongue the period of adjustment. Nevertheless, if
rational agents foresee that a protracted boom will undermine their country’s external competitiveness,
they anticipate the impact of deteriorated competitiveness. Consequently, they should reduce their
expectations of future output gap and in￿ation rate, which weakens the real interest rate mechanism.
Expecations play therefore a key role in the functioning of both mechanisms and a thorough analysis
of the adjustment dynamics is only possible when the expectation formation process is modelled with
due precision. In this article, we apply a stylized, New Keynesian-based framework with rational
expectations. With a hybrid speci￿cation of the IS and Phillips curves, it can ￿ however ￿ encompass
various speci￿cations of expectations being a linear combination of rationally expected values, past
observations and a constant (e.g. adaptive or static).
A rational expectations model needs to be solved before use in simulation analyses. In this paper
we argue that, under certain assumptions regarding monetary policy framework in the euro area and
given the empirical evidence on expectations in the euro area from the literature, the application of
classical solution methods (as in Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) can be insu￿cient.
Firstly, this is because the rotation scheme in the ECB Governing Council (henceforth: the Council), as
constituted by the Treaty of Nice, may imply time-varying parameters in the Taylor rule approximating
the ECB decisions. At present, the Council includes all the national central bank governors from the
4euro area countries with the right of vote in every decision meeting. 1 In this institutional setup, further
euro area enlargement would imply a growing number of the Council members. This could lower the
e￿ectiveness of the decision process due to coordination problems (see e.g. Gerlach-Kristen, 2005).
This was the motivation behind introducing a rotation system after the number of euro area members
would exceed 15.2 Under the Treaty, part of the governors would be rotationally excluded from the
voting. As Subsection 2.2 presents, a time-varying model is adequate when the rotation is coupled
with some home bias of the Council members in taking interest rate decisions.
Secondly, the inclination of economic agents to form in￿ation expectations ￿rst and above all on the
basis of the events in the domestic economy justi￿es imposing heterogenous information sets across
countries and hence across model equations. The simulation results presented in the paper suggest
that both aspects can impact the volatility of in￿ation and output in the monetary union countries.
Section 2 describes the proposed model of a monetary union and discusses the limitations of standard
solution methods in its case. Section 3 reviews the literature on solving rational expectations models,
with particular attention being paid to the metod of Christiano (2002) applied here. In Subsection 3.2
a method of solving a model with variable coe￿cients is proposed. Section 4 presents the application
of the methods considered. Section 5 concludes.
2 New Keynesian model of cross-country adjustment within the
euro area
2.1 Adjustment mechanisms in the rational expectations model
The model considered in this paper draws heavily on the workhorse 3-equation New Keynesian model
for monetary policy analyses. It is composed of an output gap equation (IS curve), in￿ation equation
(Phillips curve) and nominal interest rate equation (central bank rule). The model has been extended
to capture speci￿c features of a group of open economies, forming a monetary union, with the
competitiveness channel and the real interest rate e￿ect.
The union-wide monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule with smoothing (see e.g. Sauer and
Sturm, 2003, for an extensive survey on Taylor rule applications as approximations to the ECB policy):
1It also includes the ECB Board of Directors. For more details on the institutional context and the reform, see
Narodowy Bank Polski (2009); Gorska (2009); Kosior et al. (2008); Szymczyk (2008).
2This is the case since January 1st, 2009 when Slovakia adopted the euro.
5it = (1   )[r +  +  (t   ) + yyt] + it 1 (1)
with it ￿ nominal central bank rate at time t, yt ￿ output gap of the monetary union, t ￿ in￿ation
rate in the monetary union, r ￿ natural interest rate,  ￿ in￿ation target of the common central
bank,  2 (0;1) ￿ smoothing parameter,  > 1; y > 0 ￿ parameters for central bank reaction to
deviation of in￿ation from the in￿ation target 3 and an open output gap respectively. The in￿ation










Country weights (vector wn1) re￿ect relative sizes of n economies (j = 1;:::;n) participating in the
monetary union..4
The annualized in￿ation rate in country j (j) evolves according to a hybrid Phillips curve (see Gal￿
and Gertler, 1999; Gal￿ et al., 2001):
j;t = !f;jEtj;t+1 + !b;jj;t 1 + jyj;t + "s
j;t (4)
with "s
j;t ￿ cost-push shock in country j, yj;t ￿ output gap in j. The path of the output gap is
determined by the following IS curve, augmented with open economy components (see Clarida et al.,
2001; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2005):
yj;t = fEtyj;t+1 + byj;t 1   r
 
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(5)
where y j;t denotes the output gap outside j, Pj;t ￿ log-level of prices in j, P j;t ￿ log-level of prices
3The condition  > 1 is required for the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) to be ful￿lled and the equilibrium to be
determinate.
4Country weights used in the construction of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area
are derived from national accounts as the share of consumption spendings of households in a given country in





















The standard closed-economy speci￿cation has therefore been complemented with the real exchange
rate divergence5, Pj;t   P j;t, and external demand gap, y j;t. This corresponds to the point made
by Clarida et al. (2001) that demand conditions in a small open economy are determined by external
demand conditions and the ratio of domestic prices (expressed in foreign currency) to the world’s price
level. Excess appreciation undermines the price competitiveness of domestic goods abroad ( c > 0),
and foreign economic downturns translate into slowdowns at home ( s > 0). The rest of the parameters
in (4) and (5), in line with the New Keynesian literature, should be positive.
The model composed of equations (1)-(8) can be written in the form (13). The detailed description of
matrix construction is provided in Appendix 1.
With standard assumptions, such as constant country weights in equations (2) and (3) as well as
a standard expectation operator in (4) and (5), we can apply standard methods when solving the
model for simulations (see Subsection 3.1). The following two subsections, however, will argue that
these assumptions might have to be relaxed for the sake of an adequate description of the euro area
economy.
2.2 Rotation scheme in the ECB Governing Council
The mandate of the Council is to maintain price stability in the entire euro area (see European
Central Bank, 2003). When we interpret this literally, the conduct of monetary policy approximated
by equations (1)-(3) would remain una￿ected. However, the opponents of the voting system reform in
the ECB claim that it is a step back in the european monetary integration that additionally emphasizes
5There is no nominal exchange rate dynamics between monetary union member countries, so the real exchange rate
variance is only due to the di￿erence in price log-levels.
7the national structure of the Council (see Belke, 2003). Therefore, the counsequences of such a danger
are worth considering.
Assume that every central bank governor implicitly prefers some nominal interest rate level, conditional
upon the (possibly asymmetric) cyclical position of his country of origin:
ij;t = (1   )









If he or she wanted to reduce the cyclical stress in their country of origin (see Clarida et al., 1999;
Calmfors, 2007), they would be inclined to vote in favour of interest rate changes towards ij;t, even
if these changes were at odds with (1). 6 The ￿nal preference of the national central bank governor,
declared in the voting, is de￿ned as a weighted average of the ￿pro-european￿ rate in (1) and the
preferred rate for his country of origin, as in (9):
~ ij;t = (1   )it + ij;t (10)
The parameter  2 [0;1] measures the home bias in the decision of the Council’s members. 7 With
fully ￿pro-european￿ voters,  = 0. The other limiting case of fully home-biased voters occurs when
 = 1.
The outcome of voting at t is approximated by the arithmetic average over preferences submitted by
the governors allowed to vote at t. After the reform, only 15 (of a higher number of) Council members
would vote at a single meeting. Let aj;t be a dummy equal 1 when country j representative has got
the right to vote at t and 0 otherwise. With these assumptions, the ￿nal interest rate decision of the







aj;t  ((1   )it + ij;t) (11)
Substituting (1)-(3) and (9) into (11), we obtain the ￿nal form of the Taylor rule for the ECB:
6Clarida et al. (1999) di￿erentiate between a cyclical and a structural (long-term) stress. Calmfors (2007) and Flaig
and Wollmersh￿user (2007) ￿nd some evidence that many euro area countries have su￿ered from the latter art of stress
in the period 1999-2006. Nonetheless, the inclusion of structural stress into the governors’ preferences would result in
a ￿wandering￿ steady state of the model. In consequence, it is not impossible to analyze the second-moment properties
of variables with the tools applied in this paper, but this extension would make the results dependent on the estimates
of long-term in￿ation di￿erentials (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e￿ect) and natural rates of interest. This is why we leave
the structural aspect of the stress for future empirical research.
7In this paper, we assume equal  across all Council members.
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where symbols in bold subscripted t are vectors of size n  1 containing a sequence of identically
denoted variables over countries, and  =   1n1. Note that in (12) the parameters for in￿ation
rates and output gaps in individual economies vary in time. In consequence, so does the matrix B in
(13).
Non-constant parameters of the model (13) prevent us from applying standard solution methods
described in Subsection 3.1.
2.3 Heterogeneity in formation of expectations
A vast battery of literature analyses the cross-country heterogeneity of the euro area and its
consequences for the common monetary policy conduct. The most often explored research ￿elds include
di￿erences in product and labour market ￿exibility (HM Treasury, 2003; Rumler, 2007), in￿ation
persistence (Benigno and Salido, 2006), monetary transmission mechanisms (Clausen and Hayo, 2006)
or business cycle synchronization (Skrzypczynski, 2006). A key dimension of heterogeneity are also
expectation formation mechanisms.
There is empirical evidence in favour of this heterogeneity. The estimates of Taylor rule parameters for
countries that formed the euro area in 1999 suggest that individual central banks conducted monetary
policy in signi￿cantly di￿erent manners before they ￿nally passed this responsibility to the ECB
(Eleftheriou et al., 2006). Berger et al. (2006) ￿nd econometric evidence that expectations of future
ECB decisions substantially varied in the geogra￿c dimension in the ￿rst years of the euro area.
Woodford (2006) argues that the process of learning the new monetary policy regime among economic
agents and hence altering their expectation formation habits might be protracted.
In a monetary union, agents could expect the foreign macroeconomic shocks to hit their domestic
economy via a few channels. Firstly, the common central bank would react to foreign demand shocks
with a move in the common policy rate, which would in turn translate directly into change in domestic
monetary conditions. Secondly, a foreign shock a￿ects future price dynamics abroad. As a result,
the real exchange rate would change ￿ even when there were no direct price e￿ects at home ￿ which
is another way to in￿uence the domestic monetary conditions. Thirdly, foreign business cycle a￿ects
9the domestic output due to international trade and investment links. Economic agents are therefore
capable to predict an economic slowdown at home when they observe one in other countries.
Outside a monetary union, agents would have less incentive to monitor the foreign events. Firstly, the
reaction of foreign central banks to foreign shocks does not automatically a￿ect the nominal interest
rates at home, which remain under the command of the domestic central bank. Secondly, a shock
a￿ecting foreign price dynamics does not necessarily translate into a shift in competitive position of
domestic versus foreign producers, as measured with the real exchange rate. More precisely, this rate is
also dependent on the nominal exchange rate, which can absorb asymmetric shocks (see Stazka, 2008).
Because of these two channels, Marzinotto (2008) argues e.g. that mid-size economies are largely at
risk of excessive wage growth. Namely, their trade unions are too small to in￿uence the ECB decisions
in a signi￿cant way and too large not to fear the loss of external competitiveness. Thirdly, the ample
literature on the endogeneity of OCA criteria (e.g. integration of ￿nance and trade in a common
currency area, see Frankel and Rose, 1998 or Narodowy Bank Polski, 2009 for a survey) suggests
growing interdependence of individual countries’ output gaps after creating a monetary union.
For the reasons listed above, domestic agents ￿ especially at the initial stages of participation in a
monetary union ￿ can be accustomed to form their expectations mainly on the basis of domestic events
and to a lesser extent on the basis of foreign shocks. This would break the underlying assumptions of
the standard expectations operator applied in the model (13), based on a common information set of
agents in each country. As a consequence, this aspect of heterogeneity must be analyzed beyond the
standard model solution methods.
3 Solving linear rational expectations models
3.1 Literature overview
A dynamic linear model with rational expectations can be written as (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980):
AEtxt+1 = Bxt + C"t (13)
with xt ￿ vector of variables at time t, "t ￿ vector of random disturbances, A, B, C ￿ matrices of
model parameters. The solution of the model is a transformation of (13) into a recursive law of motion
(see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980; Uhlig, 1999; Klein, 2000; Sims, 2001):
10xt = Mxt 1 + N"t (14)
This transformation is usually performed to run counterfactual simulations, impulse-response functions
and second moment analysis (DeJong and Dave, 2007; Christiano, 2002). LindØ (2005), Fuhrer
and Rudebusch (2004) and other authors stress the possibility to use the mapping to estimate the
parameters of the solved model (14) directly via full information maximum likelihood method. They
show with Monte Carlo simulation exercises that such estimation outperforms the GMM estimator,
traditionally applied in empirical investigations of the New Keynesian model.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solved the model (13) assuming nonsingularity of A and performing the
Jordan decomposition on A 1B. They also developed a milestone theorem about the existence and
uniqueness of a solution: the number of variables predetermined at t included in xt must equal the
number of eigenvalues of the matrix A
 1B that do not exceed 1 in absolute value (saddle-path stability).
The assumption of a nonsingular matrix A is relaxed by Klein (2000) as he applies generalized complex
Schur decomposition for matrices A and B. A similar method is proposed by Sims (2001) for the
model (13) expressed in terms of true future values of variables and expectation errors rather than the
expectation operator. The solution results from a unique linear mapping from "t to the expectation
errors. S￿derlind (1999) applies a Klein-based algorithm and admits that generalized eigenvalues equal
1 in absolute terms can be classi￿ed as stable when the vector xt contains variables that are explicitly
nonstationary by construction (which also is the case in our model). Uhlig (1999) proposes a method
of undetermined coe￿cients, which reduces the problem to solving a matrix quadratic equation.
Christiano (2002) proposed a modi￿cation of the latter method applicable when individual equations
in the system have various information sets associated with their expectational terms. This approach
is useful when di￿erent groups of economic agents take their decisions with heterogenous knowledge
of contemporaneous values of economic shocks. Nonlinear models are solved with numerical methods
(see DeJong and Dave, 2007 for an overview).
The solutions of models with variable coe￿cients proposed in the literature are usually designed for
stochastic parameters (e.g. Markov switching with ￿nite number of states). Farmer et al. (2008) apply
a minimum state variable solution that expands the vector xt times the number of possible states and
adjust the parameter matrices appropriately.
113.2 Model with time-varying parameters
The time-varing Taylor rule (12) requires solving a model like (13), but with time-varying parameters:
A(t)Et (xt+1) = B(t)xt + C(t)ft (15)
The solution proposed below builds upon the algorithm by Klein (2000) 8, while introducing some
necessary generalizations. It is useless to start with a single generalized Schur decomposition because
the factor matrices we would obtain inherit the nonconstancy and parameter matrices for xt and
Et (xt+1) would not be upper triangular as we need. 9 Instead, we exploit the assumption that A(t)
and B(t) vary in time, but the values recur after m periods, i.e. A(t+j) = A(t+j+im) and B(t+j) =
B(t+j+im) for each j = 0;1;:::;m 1 and each i 2 N. Let us ￿rst factorize the matrices A(t) and B(t)




with S and T ￿ upper triangular matrices, Q and Z ￿ unitary matrices (QQH = QHQ = ZZH =
ZHZ = I).10 For the decomposition to be unique, we impose a restriction that diagonal elements of




Using (16) we can rewrite (15) for each t as:
S(t)ZH
(t)Etxt+1 = T(t)ZH
(t)xt + Q(t)C(t)ft (17)
Let us write the equation for t, t + 1, ..., t + m   1 and solve each of them for x:
8In our model, it would su￿ce to allow for only one time-varying matrix ￿ either A or B, as with the assumptions
from section 2.2 we could place all time-varying parameters into a single matrix. However, it does not really simplify
further derivations as the generalized Schur decomposition with imposed eigenvalue ordering is unique and all the output
matrices would inherit time-variability, no matter how many input matrices (1 or 2) would bear this feature. Neither
does time-dependent C(t) cause any signi￿cant analytical or numerical complication. This is why the system (15) and
its solution is expressed in more general terms that our example would require.
9A time-varying matrix Z(t) (see (16)) does not permit us to de￿ne the substitution (23) in a unique way. If we chose
some arbitrary Z matrix in time (say, Z(t)), every equation would link two di￿erent variables, which would obviously
leave no space to proceed. This problem would indeed be solved by ￿nding the generalized Schur decomposition for A(t)
and B(t+1). However, in the latter case, there would be no Q(t) to premultiply any equation leaving both matrices in
question upper triangular (see (16)).






















A bottom-up sequence of substitutions and the law of iterated expectations (see Ljungqvist and












































with the usual restriction on ordering generalized eigenvalues. Let us de￿ne an auxiliary variable:
11It would be much simpler to obtain (21) at the cost of some loss of generality. Assume nonsingular B 1
(t) for each t
(this is i.a. the case in the example considered here) and solve m ￿rst equations for x:
xt = B 1
(t)A(t)Et (xt+1)   B 1
(t)C(t)ft
xt+1 = B 1




(t+m 1)A(t+m 1)Et+1 (xt+m)   B 1
(t+m 1)C(t+m 1)ft+m 1
(19)

























13~ xt = ZH
(t)xt (23)
In line with the conventional treatment in the literature, let xt be ordered in such a way that the ￿rst
partition (x1;t) contains variables predetermined at t. Analogous partitioning of ~ xt, substitution of
















































Following Klein (2000), we solve the lower, decoupled row of (24) for ~ x2;t:
~ x2;t = T
 1









The ￿nite cycle of length m, in which the parameters of A(t) and B(t) recur, implies D(t) = D(t+m)
and Rk(t) = Rk(t+m) for each k. We can therefore shift (21) m periods forward without changing the
parameters:
xt+m = D(t)Et+m (xt+2m) + 
m 1
k=0 Rk(t)Et+mft+m+k (26)
Matrices Q, Z, S and T, resulting from the Schur decomposition of both matrices of interest in the
above system, will equal those obtained in (22). Then, we can shift shift (25) by any multiple of m
without changing the parameters:
~ x2;t+m = T
 1








~ x2;t+2m = T
 1










As in (19), a sequence of substitutions in (25) and (27) and iterating expectations allows us to express
~ x2;t as an in￿nite sum:


















At this point, we need to know the expected path of future random disturbances, conditional on the
information that agents have at t.12 In rational expectations models, autoregressive error terms are
natural by construction and hence commonly applied, so let us assume a VAR representation (see e.g.
Mavroeidis, 2005):
ft = ft 1 + "t (29)
With Et"t+k = 0, k = 1;2;:::, we can write the in￿nite sum (28) as












































































The existence of the in￿nite sum stems from (i) ful￿lled assumptions of the Blanchard-Kahn theorem
(exactly all unstable generalized eigenvalues of A and B concentrated in the partition (2,2) of matrices
S and T) as well as (ii) stability of the process (29) (eigenvalues of  lower than 1 in absolute terms).

























12Note that a white noise disturbance immediately simpli￿es (28) to a linear dependence of ~ x2;t on current ft.











Note that the only di￿erence between this sum and L(t) is the ￿rst component G(t), so L(t)   F(t)L(t)H(t) = G(t).


























, unless the matrix is singular.










We exploit the predeterminacy of x1;t to get:









































































































In the example considered here, the vector of predetermined variables x1;t contains lags of all elements
in x2;t. Accordingly, some rows in A(t), B(t) and C(t) were trivial identities de￿ning the equivalence
between some elements of x1;t+1 and x2;t. With the relation between x1;t and x2;t in hand, we can
drop these rows and denote the remaining matrices as A(t), B(t) and C(t). Rewrite (15) without these





































































































































3.3 Model with heterogenous information sets
We use the method of undetermined coe￿cients proposed by Christiano (2002) to solve the model with
heterogenous information sets of economic agents used for forming their expectations in individual
countries of the monetary union. 14 This method ascribes an individual information set to every
equation in the system and expectational terms in any equation are conditional upon the content of
its own information set. Every information set contains all the past values of the random disturbances
and part of its contemporaneous values (in an extreme case: all or none of them).















, z1;t - n1-dimensional vector of endogenous variables non-predetermined
at t, z2;t contains q lags of z1;t necessary to determine z1;t+1 at t + 1. In our model, the lag length
14A detailed description of the method in full generality can be found in Christiano (2002). For the sake of
presentational simplicity, this section consumes all the possible simpli￿cations in the case that we are investigating.
17does not exceed 1, which means q = 0 and zt = z1;t =

1 Pt it yt t
T
is a vector of length
~ n  2 + 3n (n ￿ number of countries).
However, equation (38) is not equivalent to (13) due to a conceptual di￿erence in expectation operators.
When information sets for individual equations are heterogenous, "t (:) denotes rational expectations
























At t, only the union’s central bank is familiar with the entire vector of current country-speci￿c demand
and supply disturbances, ft =

"y;1;t ::: "y;n;t ";1;t ::: ";n;t
T
. The only contemporaneous
values of shocks that economic agents in country j take into account are ones concerning their own
country, i.e. "y;j;t and ";j;t. Shocks to the other economies enter the information set of country j
agents with a one period lag.
The restrictions excluding some elements of ft from some equations’ information sets are summarized
in the matrix  sized 2n  ~ n. Its columns correspond with equations in the system, rows ￿ with
elements of ft; [i;j] = 1 when i-th innovation is included in the information set of equation j and
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exactly due to the exclusion restrictions in . Like in Subsection 3.2, we assume a VAR respresentation
(29) for ft. This method, however, additionally requires the knowledge of the variance-covariance











5 with independence of demand and supply disturbances



































Knowing the matrices 0;1;2;0;1 and , Ve, P (see Appendix 2), we can apply the method of
Christiano (2002) to compute the matrices M;N such that the solution to (38) is of the form
zt = Mzt 1 + Nst (41)
Under complete information sets, the following framework is fully equivalent to the standard methods
(Blanchard-Kahn, Klein, Sims or Uhlig). Moreover, M is always the same as derived via standard
methods, i.e. independent on (in)completeness of information sets. When at least one of the
information sets is incomplete, the key step in pinning down N is an orthogonal projection from
the space of random disturbances included in an equation’s information set (where ft 1 and part of ft
jointly belong) to the space of all contemporanous and lagged random disturbances (where st belongs).




0 0~ n~ n































5 = 0 (42)
Factorize a and b using the generalized Schur decomposition (as in (16)). Arrange matrices Q;Z;S;T
so that the zeros on the main diagonal of S are located in its lower-right portion. This separates









5. Then, use the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition:
 S
 1
11T11 = PP 1 (43)
Let ~ P denote the rows of P 1 corresponding to the eigenvalues exceeding 1 in absolute terms. Let























To ￿nd N, de￿ne for every equation i (i.e. for every column [:;i] in ) matrix Ri as unity matrix in
which the rows corresponding to zeros in the vector [:;i] were dropped. The orthogonal projection






























i , whereby the number of columns in ai equals the number












































, and ~ R be







let ~ q be de￿ned as matrix ~ R
 
0 
 PT + (0A + 1) 
 I

in which the columns were dropped whose
numbers corresponded to the rows in ~ R that we had dropped before. The elements of N are de￿ned
by the relationship vec
 
NT
=  ~ q 1~ d , whereby the left-hand side vector ￿ before de-vectorization
into NT ￿ needs to be widened and ￿lled with zeros at the indices of dropped rows in ~ R (dropped
columns in ~ q).
4 Simulation results
The model described in Section 2 and solved with the methods from Section 3 has beed used to simulate
the path of the output gap and in￿ation rate with di￿erent assumptions regarding:
1. the home bias of the ECB Governing Council members ( );
2. the information set underlying the formation of expectations of future output and in￿ation in
the countries of a monetary union.
20Table 1 contains a set of model parameters used in the simulations. For simplicity, we assume
homogenous parameters of the IS and Phillips curves across countries. Parameter values are median
values of statistically signi￿cant estimates among 12 euro area countries over the time span 1999-2008
(from Tor￿j, 2009). The parameters, following the dominant empirical approach in the New Keynesian
literature, were estimated via generalized method of moments (see Gal￿ and Gertler, 1999; Gal￿ et al.,
2001; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2005) with standard instrument sets for both curves. The parameters
for the Taylor rule and AR processes of the random disturbances are parametrized as in the literature
overview by LindØ (2005).
Table 1: Parameters of the simulated model
!f 0.55 r 0.09  1.5  0.1
!b 0.45 c 0.04 y 0.5 y 0.5
f 0.5 s 0.09  0.5
b 0.5  0.05
Source: Tor￿j (2009) Source: LindØ (2005)
Every pair of variances compared below results from a path of variables generated with the same path
of 10000 random shocks. Demand and supply disturbances were assumed to be independent. The
variances of individual shocks were calibrated in such a way that the second moments of the baseline
paths match those observed in the data on in￿ation and output.
The results generally con￿rm those obtained from a purely backward-looking model by Kosior et al.
(2008), at least on the qualitative level. The rotation in the ECB Governing Council, coupled with
some home bias in interest rate decisions among its members, can boost the variance of in￿ation and
output gap. Table 2 presents the results of simulation when a monetary union consists of 4 equally
sized countries and 2 country representatives participate in every vote. The cycle of rotation lasts 8
quarters, and there is a switch every 2 quarters. The standard deviations of output gap and in￿ation
rise as  increases. For  = 0:5, the standard deviation of the output gap is 0:42% higher than for  = 0
(i.e. in the model with constant parameters). The standard deviation of in￿ation rises analogously by
1:64%.
21Table 2: S.D. of output gap and in￿ation (expressed as a share of S.D. under baseline scenario)
y p p p p







When the country sizes di￿er, so do the results for big, mid-size and small economies. Table 3 presents
the results of simulations generated with a 4-country model of monetary union with relative country
sizes of 0:4, 0:3, 0:2 and 0:1. Once again, 2 country representatives vote at a time, the rotation cycle
is 8 quarters long and the right of vote is granted to the governors 7, 5, 3 or 1 time a cycle, in line
with their country size.
It is only in the largest economy that the output gap volatility slightly declines as  rises. The country
of size 0:3 enjoys a slightly positive  for the same reason. However, starting from approximately
 = 0:3, it su￿ers from a rise in output volatility as the impact of ￿imported￿ instability from two
small economies and the relative loss of the central bank’s focus in favour of the greatest country
begin to dominate. In the case of the smallest economies, this e￿ect is visible for any positive home
bias because their relative weight in the union-wide Taylor rule declines with growing  (it is more
e￿cient to make big neighbours ￿pro-european￿ than to remain small and home-biased) and because
they import each other’s volatility simultaneaously. With  = 0:5, the standard deviation of the
output gap is ca. 0:76   0:77% higher and in￿ation ￿ ca. 2% higher than in the baseline scenario.
22Table 3: S.D. of output gap and in￿ation (expressed as ratio to S.D. under baseline scenario); di￿erent
country sizes
a a a a 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.1 0.9985 0.9999 1.0012 1.0012 0.9961 1.0001 1.0031 1.0028
0.2 0.9971 0.9999 1.0026 1.0026 0.9927 1.0008 1.0066 1.0062
0.3 0.9958 1.0001 1.0041 1.0041 0.9901 1.0020 1.0107 1.0100
0.4 0.9947 1.0004 1.0058 1.0058 0.9881 1.0038 1.0152 1.0145
0.5 0.9937 1.0008 1.0076 1.0077 0.9867 1.0062 1.0201 1.0195
p p p p y
w= w=
The impact of excluding the contemporaneous values of foreign demand and supply shocks from the
information set of domestic agents is vague, even on the qualitative level. Table 4 is composed of
standard deviations of output gaps when the information sets are incomplete, expressed as shares of
standard deviations in the baseline scenario with complete information. Depending on the correlation
of shocks between countries, serial correlation of country-speci￿c shocks and ￿ possibly ￿ the country
size, the incompleteness of the information set raises or reduces the volatility of output.
When the serial correlation of demand shocks is low, a home-biased information set reduces the variance
of the output gap. Foreign demand shocks with low persistence have only limited impact on the
domestic economy and start to in￿uence domestic expectations once they have partially been absorbed.
Note that the serial correlation of demand shocks at 0 0:2 remains far lower than the empirical evidence
would suggest (see LindØ, 2005).
Incomplete information sets also reduce the output volatility when the synchronicity of shocks between
countries is high. In such a monetary union, the country-speci￿c information set is su￿cient to
approximate some of the foreign noise and support the expectations as an auxiliary adjustment channel.
When agents believe that shocks are correlated across countries, they do not fear that an asymmetric
shock would induce inadequacy of the common interest rate and domestic macroeconomic aggregates.
On the other hand, under a high persistence and low symmetry of demand shocks, heterogenous and
incomplete information sets yield higher variance of the output. Only with a lag does highly useful











0.4 0.3 0.2 0.07 0.03
0 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76
0.2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
0.4 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.14
0.6 1.50 1.52 1.54 1.58 1.58
0.8 2.22 2.30 2.44 2.52 2.57
0 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71
0.2 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
0.4 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05
0.6 1.39 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.45
0.8 2.02 2.11 2.20 2.30 2.32
0 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49
0.2 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
0.4 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.71
0.6 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99
0.8 1.48 1.55 1.55 1.59 1.64
0 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
0.2 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.23
0.4 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.29
0.6 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.40
0.8 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.68
0 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06
0.2 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06
0.4 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08
0.6 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10







24information arrive in agent’s expectations. This hampers the ￿expectations￿ channel of adjustment
and the stabilization of output around the potential level is more protracted, which generates a higher
volatility. Note that such a stochastic environment is a contradiction of what the optimum currency
area theory views as perfect (synchronized business cycles and at most temporary shocks).
Finally, note the e￿ect in the row of Table 4 corresponding to empirically plausible values of demand
shocks’ serial correlation equal 0:6 and cross-country correlation equal 0:4. It suggests that in the
mid-size economies, a limited information set might generate higher output volatility, whereas in
big and small economies ￿ lower volatility. Although this result seems to be quantitatively limited,
the very fact that this model was capable to reproduce it might be seen as a weak con￿rmation of
some tentative evidence reported in earlier literature. Namely, big economies bene￿t mainly from the
stabilizing e￿ects of common monetary policy and small ones ￿ from the competitiveness channel. At
the same time, expectation as a supportive channel of stabilization after asymmetric shocks could be
particularly useful in mid-size member countries of a monetary union. In such countries, economic
agents must therefore carefully watch the external environment. This weak implication of the model
certainly needs further research, as it might be of particular importance for countries such as Poland.
5 Conclusions
This paper generalizes the analytical methods of solving linear rational expectations models to the case
of time-varying, nonstochastic parameters. The assumption of a ￿nite cycle in which the parameter
values recur is thereby exploited. The solution is exempli￿ed with the case of autoregressive random
disturbances. We also apply the method of Christiano (2002) to introduce heterogeneity in individual
countries’ information sets.
The simulations based on the former solution method con￿rm the previous ￿ndings from the literature:
the rotation in the ECB Governing Council, as implemented by the Treaty of Nice, coupled with home
bias in interest rate decisions taken by the members of the Council, increases the volatility of output
and in￿ation in most of the small and mid-size economies. However, the rise in standard deviation ￿
with the parametrisation considered here ￿ is very limited and amounts to a maximum of 2% in small
economies.
Forming expectations on the country level with a partial, home-biased information set may in turn
lead to a rise or a decline in the output volatility at home, depending on (i) the serial correlation of
25demand disturbances, (ii) their correlation across countries and possibly (iii) the country size. When
the properties of shocks do not conform to the optimum currency area theory, i.e. they are hardly
synchronized and highly persistent, the output volatility can rise as a result of introducing incomplete
information sets. There is also some limited evidence that this e￿ect could particularly occur in mid-size
economies, where expectations stabilize the output to a higher extent than common monetary policy
and competitiveness channel, unlike in big or small economies respectively.
A number of questions arise for further research. First of all, heterogeneity of expectations clearly
interacts with other aspects of euro area heterogeneity, such as market rigidities or in￿ation persistence.
The inclusion of structural stress into the analysis of ECB rotation framework would be possible when
a profounded research on long-run in￿ation and natural interest rate di￿erentials within the euro area
were carried out. Also, it would be interesting to use the solution by Christiano (2002) to derive an
empirical test for the size of agent’s information set in the economy of a real euro area member country.
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30Appendix 2: Construction of matrices used in Subsection 3.3
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